Brain matters...in Social Sciences by Rusconi, Elena et al.
AIMS Neuroscience, 3 (3): 253-263. 
DOI: 10.3934/Neuroscience.2016.3.253 
Received 8 August 2016, 
Accepted 12 August 2016, 
Published 16 August 2016 
http://www.aimspress.com/journal/neuroscience 
 
Editorial  
Brain Matters… in Social Sciences 
Elena Rusconi 1, 2, *, Jemma Sedgmond 3, Samuela Bolgan 1, Christopher D. Chambers 3 
1 Abertay University, Dundee, UK;  
2 University College London, London, UK;  
3 
*Correspondence: Email: elena.rusconi@gmail.com; Tel: +44(0)1382–308–769. 
Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK. 
Abstract: Here we offer a general introduction to cognitive neuroscience and provide examples 
relevant to psychology, healthcare and bioethics, law and criminology, information studies, of how 
brain studies have influenced, are influencing or show the potential to influence the social sciences. 
We argue that social scientists should read, and be enabled to understand, primary sources of 
evidence in cognitive neuroscience. We encourage cognitive neuroscientists to reflect upon the 
resonance that their work may have across the social sciences and to facilitate a mutually enriching 
interdisciplinary dialogue. 
 
1. Introduction 
This short piece is the elaboration of a session we held at a Summer School organized by the 
Scottish Graduate School for the Social Sciences (SGSSS) in June 2016 at the University of 
Edinburgh. Our session was primarily aimed at introducing graduate students to brain science in a 
context where this may be seen as intimidating or irrelevant. In fact—we argued—neuroscience not 
only produces nice pictures of the brain but also evidence with significant impact on traditional 
social science disciplines. We predict that the ability to read and interpret primary sources of 
evidence, rather than extracting related information from the news or popular science books, will be 
an important arrow in the quiver of the future social sciences professionals. We are now writing in a 
neuroscientific outlet with the aim to promote interdisciplinary dialogue and invite both 
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neuroscientists and social scientists to ponder on the implication of their work beyond strict 
discipline boundaries and on the necessity to keep pace with what is happening beyond their fences. 
The willingness to explore foreign territories and inquiry with other professionals will help refine 
interdisciplinary communications by building a common language and educating us to address 
questions from multiple, often complementary, perspectives. In turn, this may also help 
communicating research findings in a way that creates balanced expectations and avoid hype [1]. 
Here we employ the same broad definition of social sciences as adopted by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), that is the study of the “society and the manner in which people 
behave and influence the world around us” (esrc.ac.uk). Social sciences include disciplines such as 
demography, human geography, economics, management and business studies, education, social 
anthropology, linguistics, law, politics, international relations, psychology, sociology, science and 
technology studies, social policy and social work and others. Several of these disciplines, such as 
philosophy, law and politics, pre-date the scientific study of the brain and its relation with human 
mind and behavior, which is the aspect of brain science we are specifically concerned with here and 
which originated at the end of the 19th century. This has recently been subsumed under the umbrella 
term of cognitive neuroscience and has been growing exponentially since the end of the 20th
2. What is Cognitive Neuroscience? 
 century 
with the diffusion of neuroimaging techniques. 
Cognitive neuroscience originates from the cross-fertilization of two older disciplines: cognitive 
science and neuroscience [2]. It investigates the neural bases of the mind with a plethora of methods 
offering complementary sources of evidence.  
The scientific study of the mind became official in the second half of the 19th century, in 
concomitance with the publication of Principles of Physiological Psychology (1874) and the opening 
of the Institute for Experimental Psychology (1879) at the University of Leipzig by Wilhelm  
Wundt [3]. The first scientific models of mental processes were created through systematic 
experimental manipulation and repeated measurements of its effects on both subjective content and 
behavior. By the first half of the 20th century, however, subjectivity was rejected as a scientific object 
of study, and psychologists focused exclusively on observable behavior, especially in the United 
States. Typical experimental subjects were not humans but rats and pigeons, and psychologists 
engaged in a bid to discover the laws of behavior by manipulating rewards and punishments. 
Conditioning principles were assumed to govern learning and explain complex patterns of behavior 
without necessity to invoke a significant role for internal mental states. Although this approach 
produced valuable knowledge, its scope soon appeared too restricted. Mental processes regained 
center stage in the second half of the 20th
Cognitive science is another umbrella term that unifies research on information processing 
associated with cognitive functions, regardless of its specific topic and methodological or even 
disciplinary approach (e.g. both cognitive psychology and computer science contribute to cognitive 
 century, with the advent of cognitive science.  
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science). Cognitive scientists aim to create accurate and predictive models that describe the 
component processes of cognitive functions. Cognitive functions are a set of processes allowing 
humans to perceive stimuli, extract information, hold it in memory, and generate thoughts and 
targeted actions. From a cognitive science perspective, these can be studied without necessarily 
having to relate them to a biological substrate. From a cognitive neuroscience perspective, 
exploration of the biological counterpart of cognitive functions can provide important information to 
help generate, expand, constrain or discard cognitive models. 
Neuroscience studies the anatomy and function of nervous systems, in clinical and experimental 
settings. Similarly to the scientific study of mental processes, the scientific study of nervous systems 
gained great momentum towards the end of the 19th
Similarly to the study of mental processes, scientific studies on functional localization in 
humans started at the end of the 19
 century. In those years, a new method for 
coloring nervous systems (i.e. staining) was introduced; this led to the identification of the cellular 
unit by which nervous systems are made: the neuron. In recognition of the importance of this 
discovery, the histologists Camillo Golgi (the inventor of the staining method) and Santiago Ramón 
y Cajal (the first to discover that the nervous system is made by separate cells rather than a 
continuous network) jointly received the Nobel prize in 1906. Neurons have three basic parts: a cell 
body, which is where metabolic processes occur (these processes are supported by oxygen and 
metabolites provided by the vascular system); an axon, that typically carries information via the 
rapid propagation of electrical charges and consequent release of chemicals (neurotransmitters) in the 
space between neurons; and dendrites that receive signals from other neurons via contact with the 
neurotransmitters that they release. Most neuroscientific techniques therefore target one or more of 
these processes and interact with or measure metabolism, blood flow, chemical and electrical activity 
in single neurons or in populations of neurons.  
th century and then received a further boost in the middle of the 
20th century, with the famous pre-operatory mapping studies of Wilder Penfield and colleagues [4,5]. 
Penfield applied small electrical currents to the exposed cerebral cortex of epileptic patients who 
were awake and awaiting for brain surgery. By targeting neighboring parts of the exposed cortex 
behind the central sulcus, for example, he noticed that patients could perceive tactile stimuli in 
neighboring parts of their body. This subtended a principle of topographic correspondence between 
populations of neurons and sensory stimulation on the body. He also noticed that the area of cortex 
devoted to each part of the body was not directly proportional to the size of the body part but to its 
sensitivity (e.g. the face is represented by a larger area of cortex than the trunk). The technique 
employed by Penfield can be described as intracranial stimulation and belongs to one of the two 
main categories of techniques: manipulation techniques, which can establish causal relationships 
between brain substrates and mental or behavioral processes. Other techniques belonging to this 
category are: extracranial brain stimulation (including Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, TMS; 
Transcranial Electric Stimulation, TES; Transcranial Pulsed Ultrasound, TPU), lesions (spontaneous 
or artificially induced), pharmacological interventions, and optogenetics. The second category of 
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techniques consists of measurement techniques, which detect and measure—rather than  
manipulating—brain states. These include direct (intracellular or extracellular) recordings from 
neurons, electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERPs), magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and 
optical brain imaging. 
Cognitive neuroscience is the label employed since the end of the 20th
3. Brain Matters… 
 century to indicate 
research activities at the intersection of cognitive science and neuroscience. Cognitive neuroscience 
thus largely builds on the inheritance of older disciplines such as neuropsychology and experimental 
psychology, encompassing the use of all of the techniques available to the cognitive scientist and to 
the neuroscientist to create neurobiologically grounded models of cognition. Its aims are ambitious 
and include localizing cognitive functions, identifying the neural basis of typical and atypical 
cognition, and establishing a link between genetics and cognitive abilities via variations in brain 
structure and function. It is interdisciplinary and requires the mastering of concepts and methods 
from both cognitive science and neuroscience. 
3.1. Example 1—Psychology 
It will come as no surprise that, historically, one of the first social sciences to benefit from using 
brain data was psychology in the second half of the 19th century. Until the scientific method started 
to be systematically applied to the study of the mind, philosophers used to investigate the 
phenomenology of cognition. They answered questions such as how we perceive the world, how we 
learn to speak, whether we have free will and if so by what age, etc. By the end of the 18th century, 
Immanuel Kant had forcefully introduced with his Critique of Pure Reason [6] the idea that we learn 
through innate mental categories: the structure of our knowledge is dependent on an innate mental 
structure. By the beginning of the 19th
With the observations of the French neurologist Paul Broca [8] on Monsieur Leborgne (also 
known as patient “Tan”) the idea of a cerebral localization of mental functions started to be widely 
accepted in the scientific community, also due to his rigorous methodological approach [9]. In 
Broca’s own words, that 50-year old patient showed a strikingly selective deficit in his language 
 century, physicians had started to realize from the study of 
war wounds that injuries to different parts of the brain may be related to different impairments of 
mental functions. Franz Joseph Gall [7] hypothesized that the differential development of various 
parts of the brain may explain differences between people in character and abilities. He also 
maintained that by measuring bumps on the skull (i.e. a craniological measurement) it would be 
possible to measure the underlying brain structure and infer individual characteristics. Although this 
approach, called phrenology, turned out to be based on wrong assumptions, it helped popularize the 
idea that different mental functions are localized in different parts of the brain. 
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function, so Broca looked for information on his history, and found out that he had been admitted at 
Bicêtre 21 years earlier because he had lost the ability to speak: “When he arrived at Bicêtre … he 
was then perfectly healthy and intelligent, and differed from a sane man only in the loss of 
articulated speech … He understood all that was said to him; he even had very fine hearing; but, 
regardless of the question addressed to him, he always responded: ‘tan, tan’ … He was considered, 
on the contrary, as a man perfectly responsible for his acts” [8,10]. The symptom was still present at 
50, when his physical (but not mental) health had widely deteriorated and he was re-admitted to 
hospital with a gangrenous leg. He died 6 days later and Broca performed a post-mortem analysis of 
his brain—without sectioning it in order to preserve the specimen for a museum. The inspection 
suggested to Broca that a localised lesion of the left frontal hemisphere had caused selective 
problems at articulating speech in the presence of normal language comprehension (“the third frontal 
convolution is that which presents the most extensive loss of substance”; “it is in the third frontal 
convolution that the disease began” [8,10]). A few months after publication of the report on patient 
“Tan”, Broca found a patient with similar symptoms, Monsieur Lelong. At 84, Lelong had a stroke 
that left him unconscious. He partly recovered but remained unable to utter any words except for a 
selected few “oui, non, toi, toujours, Lelo”. About one year later, he was admitted to hospital with a 
fractured femur and died after 12 days. Also in this case, Broca was able to analyse the brain post-
mortem and wrote: “I will not deny my surprise bordering on stupefaction when I found that in my 
second patient the lesion was rigorously occupying the same site as the first” [10,11]. By 1865, 18 
out of 20 patients with acquired speech difficulties or “aphasia” were found to have a  
left-sided lesion [12]. 
The importance of this work in a clinical neurological setting is obvious. But what is Broca’s 
legacy for psychology? To be fair, the idea of a “faculty” of articulate language or its localisation in 
the frontal lobes was already in the air. However, Broca combined detailed accounts of clinical 
manifestations with systematic searches for the neurological correlate of the inability to produce 
articulate language (as opposed to language as a unitary function), he used the pathological (as 
opposed to craniological) method with post-mortem examination and focused the attention to 
individual cerebral convolutions rather than to the whole of frontal lobes. He paved the way for the 
use of clinical and neurological evidence to investigate the components of complex psychological 
faculties such as language. 
In 1874, Carl Wernicke described a patient whose articulate speech was intact but who had 
instead difficulties in understanding verbal language [13]. His lesion was still in the left hemisphere 
but more posterior than Broca’s patients’ lesion. Wernicke put forward an anatomo-functional model, 
in which the faculty of language was fractionated into discrete but connected components, having 
different anatomical correlates. He distinguished between a “centre” for acoustic-verbal images, 
localised in the temporal lobe and a “centre” for motor-verbal images, localised in the frontal lobe. In 
the work of Wernicke, although still very rudimentary, we can already find the three main levels of 
description which are required in order to build a neuropsychological model: the psychological level, 
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which aims to specify the architecture of the cognitive system, the neurological level, which aims to 
localise specific mental operations in the brain, and the clinical level, which describes distinctive 
behavioural symptoms and preserved abilities. In the second half of the 19th
In more recent years, the availability of manipulation techniques like TMS has allowed us to 
test associations and dissociations of symptoms in the same healthy participants (rather than between 
patients) by adopting a virtual lesion (or reversible lesion) approach. This offers a complementary 
approach rather than a replacement of lesion studies and enables the refinement of models of mental 
functions by using experimental tasks and protocols that would be impossible with neurological 
patients. In general, such techniques enable the psychologist to selectively modulate the efficiency of 
multiple components of a mental function and assess their interplay at the individual or the  
group level [14,15]. 
 century, many 
neurologists took the view that language was a multi-componential function. The most influential 
model was Lichtheim’s, who added to Wernicke’s model a conceptual component, containing the 
meaning of words. This specification of functional centres and connections between them allowed 
Lichtheim to predict the existence of different types of language impairments, depending on the level 
at which the language system was lesioned. Although cognitive neuroscience does not look for 
“centres” anymore, this approach marked the start of a new discipline, neuropsychology, which has 
informed and constrained the current models of mental functions by the analysis of associations and 
dissociations of symptoms and spared functions in neurological patients. 
3.2. Example 2—Healthcare and bioethics 
Cognitive neuroscience has offered fresh and challenging evidence, which is awaiting to be 
fully incorporated in current practice, to healthcare professionals and bioethicists dealing with 
patients in permanent vegetative state (PVS) or minimally conscious state (MCS). Patients who wake 
up from a coma may show a dissociation between their spared wakefulness and impaired awareness; 
they are usually diagnosed with PVS (the most severe form) or MCS (a form with better prognosis) 
but the boundary between the two has now become less clear than it was in the past and there are 
suggestions that the “permanent” attribute be dropped from the VS diagnosis. These patients are 
particularly challenging because, although their eyes are open, they are unable to interact with their 
surroundings (e.g. they cannot execute commands, voluntarily track moving objects/people with their 
gaze or show a localized response to pain). Some of these patients recover spontaneously within a 
few months, while others remain in such state for years. Moreover the variability in the extent of 
their lesion is not related with the potential for recovery in a univocal way [16]. 
High profile legal cases such as those of Terri Schiavo and Eluana Englaro [17] have emerged 
where a lengthy legal battle preceded the permission to interrupt life support. In the case of Englaro, 
for example, the suspension of feeding and hydration after 17 years, which lead to the death of the 
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patient in a few days, was in part based on the fact that she had not shown clear signs of awareness 
for a long time and her fitting the behavioral criteria for a PVS diagnosis [18]. 
Recent neuroimaging studies have suggested that patients who do not show any overt response 
to external commands may still intentionally modulate their brain activity even in the absence of 
overt behavior [19,20]. Up to 40% of patients with a diagnosis of vegetative state may show signs of 
conscious awareness when tested with neuroimaging techniques [16]. In recent years, a new measure 
has also been proposed that bypasses completely the need for the patient to follow any commands: 
the Perturbation Complexity Index (PCI; [21]). The PCI would be measured by targeting the brain 
with a small magnetic impulse and measuring the passive spread of electrical activity throughout the 
whole brain. Although this is still experimental and requires further validation, it is thought to offer 
an objective measure of the potential of the brain for recovery. It also shifts the emphasis from a 
behavioral-active to a bodily-passive way of diagnosing conscious awareness.  
From a bioethical standpoint, the possible introduction of these techniques in routine medical 
practice will emphasize evidence of an individual’s bodily potential over concerns about quality of 
life from the perspective of their familial and social network. It would mean giving control back to 
the patient as opposed to it lying with their family. From a philosophical standpoint this practice will 
both build on and further reinforce views that postulate the substantial identity between brain and 
mind. Lawmakers, healthcare professionals, cognitive neuroscientists, journalists and bioethicists are 
thus engaging in complex discussions on whether and how these new findings should change our 
future approach to the issue. 
3.3. Example 3—Law and criminology 
Besides the substrates of consciousness, cognitive neuroscientists have also started to 
investigate complex mental processes such as moral beliefs, intentions and free-will and found 
evidence that challenges traditional notions of criminal responsibility and the law built around them [22]. 
In courtrooms around the world, neuroimaging findings about a defendant’s brain anatomy and 
function are now used as evidence to show abnormalities, to argue why mitigating factors should be 
taken into account, or demonstrate the presence of crucial memories when self-reports appear 
unreliable. The more neuroimaging techniques, and fMRI in particular, are presented as  
mind-reading tools [23], the more it appears plausible that these will be used, in a not-so-far future, 
to overcome the intrinsic weaknesses of eyewitness’s testimony or the lack of directly incriminating 
evidence. They are often presented as ideal tools to detect deception or malignancy in legal settings. 
Further, they are already used in some corporate settings to test the reliability of  
prospective employees [24]. 
How realistic are these claims? According to certain media reports and to firms offering the 
latest scientific lie detection services, these are realistic expectations and it is only a matter of time 
before fMRI becomes available everywhere. However, social scientists may have to dig a little 
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deeper than enthusiastic media reports and not be misled by scientific-looking claims that are made 
in an obvious conflict of interest. They may need to reach out for primary sources. Because if they do, 
they will discover that most neuroscientists would agree that fMRI should not be used as  
lie detector [25]  
There are several reasons, scientific and not, why we should be skeptical about the potential for 
fMRI in lie detection. First of all these claims rest on unwarranted assumptions and inferences 
pertaining to both cognitive models of lying and the mapping of mental content to brain substrates. 
Second, the differences between the forensic and the laboratory setting makes it impossible to apply 
lab results into the real world: whilst in the former the truth is most often unknown and the individual 
may have an incentive to adopt countermeasures, in the latter experimenters often know what the 
truth is and participants do not have incentives as strong to adopt countermeasures. Third, and 
contrary to public expectations, MRI scanners are not mind readers: they measure correlates of 
mental activity through changes in oxygenated blood flow, which proponents suggest they denote 
lying. Fourth, the effect of many potential confounds (e.g. age, social diversity, mental disorders, 
personal incentives) on fMRI responses in a laboratory and in a forensic setting is largely unknown. 
Moreover, fMRI responses are highly vulnerable to countermeasures, among other concerns.  
In addition to the scientific concerns, there is a long list of legal and ethical hurdles that make it 
very unlikely that fMRI will be adopted in the courtroom any time soon. These have been analyzed 
elsewhere [24]. Thus, some basic understanding of the neuroscientific literature, combined with 
knowledge of relevant legal and ethical clauses, will produce a more realistic appreciation of this 
issue and related expectations in both neuroscientists and social scientists alike. 
3.4. Example 4—Information studies 
The success and popularity of brain science offers novel material for studies in information 
science. Castel et al. [26] conducted an interesting study on the allure of brain images in science 
communication. They showed that the pairing of logically flawed news information with a picture of 
brain activations could sway readers’ judgments away from critical thinking. Indeed, news 
accompanied by an image of brain activations were judged as more scientific that news accompanied 
by box plots or complex images that could not be as directly related to brain anatomy. The authors 
speculated that these images may be easily mistaken by the public (anybody who does not work in 
neuroscience) as real photographs of the brain. In fact, most images are not pictures of single brains, 
and fMRI does not measure brain activation directly: colored blobs indicate maps of statistical 
significance in the levels of oxygen in the local blood flow rather than neuronal activations. 
Weisberg et al. [27] further reported that people tend to find bad explanations of psychological 
phenomena more convincing, if they contain some reference to neuroscientific data rather than to 
psychological constructs only. This has alerted information scientists of the power of neuroscience 
and the need to inform and educate both professionals and the general public.  
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Accordingly, Legrenzi and Umiltà [28] have raised a warning against the hype surrounding 
anything containing the prefix neuro- (their critical essay is conveniently titled “Neuro-mania”). 
These criticisms are valid and likely motivated by a widely perceived tradeoff between the  
ever-increasing popularity of neuroimaging among social scientists and the importance of the 
contribution that most of the studies conducted with neuroimaging have actually brought about 
within and outside of brain sciences. They should be taken cum grano salis and with the 
understanding that the phenomenon the authors are targeting concerns especially the recent wave of 
fMRI studies rather than brain science tout court.  
A few years down the line, independent researchers failed to replicate the nefarious 
neuroscience effects mentioned above [29] and highlighted that the original studies had actually 
found effects of almost negligible size. However, we expect this revised specialist view not to find its 
way into the popular media—and thus reach the public or experts in information studies—as easily 
as the original view [30]. 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, here we argued that brain studies matter in social sciences by offering examples 
from different disciplines where brain studies have changed, are changing or claim the potential to be 
a source of change of the way we approach topics in the social sciences. We believe that it is useful 
and important for social scientists to acquire foundational concepts and become aware of the 
advantages and limitations of the most popular neuroscientific techniques. In this way they can reach 
a critical appreciation of the evidence reported in primary and secondary sources and with potential 
impact on their fields. These foundational concepts are a first step to enable the interpretation of the 
claims that we often read in the news and the navigation through the peer-reviewed scientific 
literature (that is access to primary sources of evidence). On the other hand it is useful and important 
for neuroscientists not to shy away from questioning how their research may affect both theory and 
practice in other fields and from exploring ways to communicate in a truthful but accessible way 
with other professionals. 
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